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In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he became the fifth British prime minister to take up the position over a six-year span.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its sixth prime minister in 24 months – with three in the past 10 months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Key background: ever since Macron initiated an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament split into three warring blocs – left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now almost twice the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

To such an extent that the following day, he stepped down. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job virtually unworkable.

Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The president’s office confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister 48 hours later.

Macron honored his word – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The issue is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would lose seats, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not escape its predicament until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Numerous observers believe that cultural shift will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”